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ISSUES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR
RADIOLOGICAL TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
ALBERT M. CHURCH and ROGER D. NORTON*
INTRODUCTION
As of 1980, there were 75 nuclear power plants in existence in the
United States. Several million packages of military and civilian radio-
active materials travel over the nation's transportation routes every
year. The volume of radiological shipments is growing rapidly. One
study predicted that shipment volumes would increase by ten-fold
between 1975 and 1985.1 The safety record of the nuclear industry
is good, but radiological accidents do happen. Clearly, their chances
of happening are increasing over time.
Emergency preparedness for radiological accidents differs from
normal emergency preparedness in a number of respects: it involves
evaluating and reacting to an unseen hazard in timely fashion and
facilitating rapid communications between several layers of govern-
ment, including the federal government. Also, as will be seen, speed
of response is of greater relevance to different classes of decisions
concerning radiological accidents than to decisions concerning typi-
cal non-radiological industrial or highway accidents. Nuclear acci-
dents can occur at specific sites (reactor sites, waste disposal sites, de-
fense plants, etc.), or at any point along transportation routes. In this
discussion, we concentrate on preparedness for transportation acci-
dents, since site-specific planning is relatively more developed and is
inherently more tractable, being confined to a manageable number of
locations.
The next section outlines the major issues and decision areas re-
garding preparedness for radiological emergencies. The final section
draws together the conclusions of that discussion.
THE MAJOR ISSUES IN RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The issues which have emerged in recent years on this topic arise in
connection with the emergency response decisions to be made by
*The authors are professors of Economics at the University of New Mexico. The material
in this article is based in part on research supported by the U.S. Department of Energy and
the New Mexico Energy and Minerals Department However, the responsibility for the views
expressed here rests with the authors.
1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Environmental Statement on the Trans-
portation of Radioactive Material By Air and Other Modes, to F.R. 23768, NUREG-0170
(December 1977) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].
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local governments, the role of federal, state and local governments in
accident response, and the methodological concerns in emergency re-
sponse planning. We list and then discuss these issues in that sequence.
a) Decision-related Issues
* Pre-notification: at the state and local level, who should be in-
formed of the contents of radioactive shipments, and with
how much lead time?
" What scale of emergency should be planned for? Does the like-
lihood (which is remote) of large-scale catastrophes affect the
desired degree of preparedness for them?
* At the local level, who should be charged with emergency re-
sponse?
" At the local level, who is responsible for the potential evacua-
tion decision?
" How do we develop criteria for determining the desired speed
of emergency response? In what respects is time most essen-
tial?
* What kinds of training and equipment are required for re-
response teams?
b) Issues Related to Intergovernmental Relationships
* What are the merits of relying on regional federal response
teams instead of local government units to handle radiological
accidents?
" What sort of plans should be and are being undertaken by state
and local government and what are their costs?
c) Methodological Issues
" Is benefit-cost analysis applicable to deciding the design and
scale of emergency response programs?
" Do there exist clear criteria regarding adequate levels of emer-
gency preparedness?
a). Decision Related Issues
Pre-notification has been a contentious issue, pitting the states
against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation (DOT). A number of states have promul-
gated regulations requiring advance notification to the state of each
radioactive shipment passing through it. In many instances, these reg-
ulations require that the governor be so notified. Critics of such regu-
lations have pointed out, however, that a governor is not necessarily
the most appropriate person in the state to notify.2 Last-minute
changes in schedules by drivers and shippers pose an operational
problem in pre-notification. These changes make ensuring the accu-
2. State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Management, Transportation Workshop,
Report, 19 (Washington, D.C. 1981).
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racy and timeliness of notification difficult. Further, federal officials
are concerned that dissemination of information on these shipments
may facilitate sabotage attempts.
We would like to suggest that the debate concerning pre-notifica-
tion has been on the wrong track. If the premise is accepted that pre-
notification is required primarily for emergency preparedness pur-
poses, then the role of the pre-notification information becomes
clearer: it is to assist the emergency response team in acting more
effectively. Following this line of reasoning, a state's governor need
not receive routine pre-notification (although he would want to re-
tain the right to request statistical tabulations or other occasional
data on the shipments). In fact, no one need receive the information
routinely-for in most instances it would not be required for deci-
sions. Instead, what is required is access: the ability to identify the
contents of a shipment immediately in the event that it is involved in
an accident. For this purpose, an accessible system of electronic in-
formation storage would be more effective than regular written com-
munications. For example, a terminal operated only by designated
individuals could be installed in the state police headquarters. After a
patrolman arrives at the scene of an accident and notices the nuclear
placard, he would radio headquarters for a description of the con-
tents of a given truck (identified by location, time, license number,
and other obtainable information). The terminal operator then would
request a description of shipment contents from the national pre-
paredness information system. This information should be available
immediately, and would be relayed to the patrolman. Other modali-
ties could be visualized, but this example illustrates how an emer-
gency-oriented notification system could operate. Most of the issues
discussed in this article are of an institutional nature, but the pre-
notification issue is one which may be, in essence, a technological
problem of information retrieval, storage, and timely transmission. A
system for providing access to shipment information may be worth
investigating as a potential contribution to resolving the state-federal
conflicts over pre-notification rules.
The problems caused by the lack of information on shipments are
amply illustrated by the case of a rail accident in North Carolina. In
March of 1977, a train carrying uranium hexafluoride and other haz-
ardous materials derailed near Rockingham, and the response to that
accident has become a textbook case of inadequate emergency pre-
paredness, primarily owing to ineffective communication. According
to the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), "at least 17 Fed-
eral, State, local, and private agencies responded to the accident.
However, no one assumed control until a state radiological team
October 19811
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arrived. Even then, a lack of coordination and serious communica-
tion problems existed." 3
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted a
special investigation of that incident. As matters turned out, "the
primary threat at Rockingham was chemical, not radioactive. How-
ever, preoccupation with radioactivity prevented the timely response
to the explosion and chemical dangers." 4 The NTSB also concluded
that
" "The initial notification of emergency response agencies was time
consuming and of questionable effectiveness because of the inade-
quacy of the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad's contingency plan."
* "The emergency response plans concerning radioactive hazardous
materials were inadequate."
" "An effective hazardous materials emergency response plan must
include designation of the on-scene commander, delineate the co-
ordination of effort between all organizations, require prompt
establishment of a command post, and provide guidance for com-
munications and control of access to the accident site."
* "The current system of classifying hazardous materials does not
provide emergency response personnel with suitable information
with which to diagnose the relative dangers and formulate opera-
tional plans."
The role of emergency preparedness plans is discussed further in a
later section of this article.
The question of the scale of a potential accident for which prepa-
ration should be adequate also deserves consideration. The NRC and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have issued
guidelines for emergency plans for site-specific facilities.5 They have
addressed a range of contingencies for these sites, including core
melt-downs. For transportation accidents, the potential magnitude is
extremely variable, but, even at the extreme, less catastrophic than
the worst reactor accident. In a companion paper in this volume,
Norton has summarized some of the accident-scenario literature.6 He
3. U.S. General Services Administration and Federal Preparedness Agency, Federal Re-
sponse Plan For Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (Interim Guidance), Annex I, Guidelines
for Federal-State Relationships, 26 (Washington, D.C., April 1977) [hereinafter FEDERAL
RESPONSE PLAN].
4. National Transportation Safety Board, Special Investigation Report: On-Scene Coor-
dination Among Agencies at Hazardous Material Accidents, 17, TO 1.1 12/2:NTSB-HZM-79-
3 (September 1979).
5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency,
CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF RADIOLOGICAL EMER-
GENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS, NURREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1 (January 1980).
6. Norton, Policy Issues in the Routing of Radioactive Materials Shipments, 21 NAT.
RES. J. (1981).
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concludes that, apart from the possibility of sabotage of a shipment
of high-level waste or spent fuel in an urban area, the worst-case out-
come would involve tens of fatalities, not hundreds, and possibly the
evacuation of hundreds or thousands of people. For organizing emer-
gency preparedness, the potential magnitude of the accident is most
relevant to planning for possible evacuations. Radiological injuries do
not present the same degree of urgency as many other kinds of injur-
ies. Thus, speed of response is most important for non-radiological
injuries and for the decision to evacuate an accident site.
The issues concerning the designation of responsible parties for
emergency response in general and evacuation in particular are inter-
related. While offices of emergency preparedness exist at the state
level, the first local official on the scene of the accident will make
the important decisions, other than those pertaining to decontamina-
tion and other post-accident clean-up operations. The first responsible
person at the scene normally is a fireman or policeman (or sheriff),
usually the latter. In the unlikely event of a threat to the population
in the zone of the accident-for example a possibly radioactive smoke
plume drifting toward dwellings-this person might have to make an
immediate evacuation decision in the interests of public safety. In
New Mexico, for example, an evacuation decision is presently the re-
sponsibility of county-level officials of the state's Office of Civil
Emergency Preparedness.7 Clearly, this division of labor could cause
inefficiency in the event of an accident requiring immediate decisions.
For purposes of limiting the potential for large numbers of injuries
or fatalities in a radiological accident, the evacuation decision could
be the most important part of emergency response. Therefore, orga-
nizalional changes which would facilitate the flows of information
required for that decision and timely implementation of it would
constitute a clear contribution to improved emergency preparedness.
A formal transfer of responsibility for accident-related evacuation
decisions to the police would exemplify such a change.
The speed of emergency response can be determined by the ade-
quacy of plans, efficiency of information networks, and a number of
organizational factors. For accidents in transportation, the spatial
distribution of response facilities also affects the speed of response.
Thus, a fiscal question arises: should expenditures be made to locate
the facilities at closer intervals along transportation routes? To an-
swer this question, it is necessary to consider the reasons why speed
7. R. Cummings, H. Burness, R. Norton, THE PROPOSED WASTE ISOLATION PILOT
PROJECT (WIPP) AND IMPACTS IN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO: A SOCIOECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS, ch. 7, EMD-2-67-1139(s), TD 898 c.8 (Albuquerque, April 1981)
[hereinafter CUMMINGS, WIPPI.
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of response is required. In all accidents, saving the lives of the injured
clearly depends in part on quick treatment. Society has developed
emergency procedures designed to provide timely treatment. Whether
these procedures are adequate in the sense of timeliness may be a
legitimate question, but for non-radiological injuries that question is
beyond our purview. We have discussed the importance of time in re-
gard to a possible evacuation decision, but for this issue timeliness
would not be served by constructing facilities at closer intervals. Per-
haps a marginal contribution to speed of response could be achieved
by expanding the police force, so that on the average a patrolman in
the field is likely to be within closer range of an accident, but the ex-
pected time savings from such measures would not be likely to be sig-
nificant.
Finally, we consider the response requirements imposed by the
nature of radiological injuries. For these injuries, special procedures
are required, but time is not a particularly important factor. Existing
medical handbooks state that providing first aid for non-radiological,
life-threatening injuries is the first responsibility in treating victims of
radiological accidents.8 Radiological decontamination and treatment
should be attended to only after this first responsibility has been sat-
isfied. This brief review suggests, therefore, that the nature of radio-
logical accidents does not justify additional expenditures for enhanc-
ing the speed of response. Expenditures may be required for other
aspects of response capabilities, but not particularly for increased
timeliness.
The training and equipment required for handling radiological acci-
dents does differ from that associated with other kinds of accidents.
The primary equipment requirement for hospitals treating patients
exposed to radioactive contaminants is a diagnostic radioisotope
facility. Many counties in the country presently lack a hospital with
such facilities. Therefore, cases involving radioactive contamination
would have to be handled elsewhere. A recent study9 revealed that
18 of New Mexico's 32 counties do not have diagnostic radioisotope
facilities. Seven of these counties do not have a hospital at all, and
eleven counties with hospitals do not have these facilities. Given that
radiological injuries do not present the same urgency as other kinds
of injuries often do, the lack of radioisotope facilities in some locales
does not mean injuries from radiation exposure will go untreated.
The lack of such facilities, however, presents another kind of danger:
an inadequately equipped hospital may refuse to handle a possibly
8. E. Saenger, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS, U.S. ATOMIC EN-
ERGY COMMISSION (1963).
9. CUMMINGS, WIPP, supra note 7, ch. 7.
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contaminated patient, and the time required to transport him to an-
other hospital may be critical for the treatment of other injuries.
In the ten years 1971-1980 (through May 8, 1980), there were 195
handling and transportation accidents involving radioactive ship-
ments. Five of those events involved package failures which resulted
in releases of radioactivity.' 0 A total of 38 packages failed to the
point of releasing radioactivity, out of many millions of packages
shipped in this period." This is a very good safety record, but clearly
the number of accidents will increase as shipment volumes increase,
and hence the argument for equipping virtually every hospital in the
nation with a diagnostic radioisotopic facility therefore will carry
ever greater weight.
Another equipment need concerns the first-on-scene officials. In
light of the above discussion about possible evacuation of the affected
area, policemen and firemen clearly require some means to evaluate
the potential radiation threat to surrounding populations.' 2 Pre-
notification has been mentioned in this context, and also installation
of metering equipment in official cars is one logical step toward
meeting this need, along with requisite training of local officials. One
school of thought argues that evaluation of the radiation threat
should be left to regional federal emergency response teams. This
argument, however, fails to account for the risk that weather or other
contingencies may prevent early arrival of the federal team. The Cali-
fornia Resources Agency has come down firmly on the side of prop-
erly equipping local government response teams:
State and local police and emergency crews are generally recognized
as initially responsible for emergency action. Although some state
and local police, fire, and emergency crews are trained and equipped
with radiation detection instruments, most crews generally do not
possess special knowledge or competence concerning radioactive
materials. For this reason, state and local agencies must provide
plans for the initial emergency action. This includes providing essen-
tial training and equipment to ensure that a properly trained and
10. J. McClure, E. Emerson, A REVIEW OF U.S. ACCIDENT/INCIDENT EXPERI-
ENCE INVOLVING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM),
1971-1980, 2-3 Sandia Nat. Lab Rep., SAND 80-0899C, TTC-0100 (Albq. 1980).
11. It is likely that more releases occurred but went unnoticed: "perhaps one in ten im-
properly closed packages is detected and reported." ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF
TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TO AND FROM NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Appendix A, at 72 (December
1972).
12. Guide and Example Plan for Development of State Emergency Response Plans and
Systems for Transportation-Related Radiation Incidents, REGIONAL TRAINING COM-
MITTEE, REGION VII, AND THE WESTERN INTERSTATE NUCLEAR BOARD (April
1975).
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equipped emergency response crew is immediately available. Since
some injured persons may need special treatment, facilities capable
of treating contaminated patients should also be available.' '
Training is equally important in emergency response. Firemen may
refuse to respond to a fire call involving suspected radiation contami-
nation owing to their lack of training for such contingencies.' 4 Both
attitudinal training and training in the mechanics of radiation should
be emphasized in preparing local officials for radiological accidents.
For New Mexico, it has been estimated that the total discounted
costs over 30 years of training and equipment for police, hospital
staffs, and firemen, including retraining, would be slightly over $6
million' ' with a 67/8% discount rate. This outlay would bring the
state's emergency response capabilities to levels commensurate with
the risks imposed by the operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP). While there are not many nuclear waste disposal sites in the
nation, most states are experiencing increasing volumes of radioactive
shipments. A corresponding effort to upgrade emergency response
facilities across the nation could lead to significant fiscal outlays.
The federal government has been defraying some of these costs by
providing training to local officials through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). To the extent that residents of partic-
ular localities may feel that they are bearing an undue share of the
external costs associated with nuclear facilities, the pressure for fed-
eral cost-sharing in this area can be expected to increase.
b). Issues Related to Intergovernmental Relationships
The federal government's role in the area of radiological emergency
preparedness is extensive. Generally, it involves three kinds of func-
tions: issuing guidelines for state and local agencies to use in their
own drafting of emergency response plans, maintaining a capability
to respond to incidents involving weapons and other federally-con-
trolled nuclear materials, and being prepared to assist states as called
upon in radiological emergencies.
For several western states, the latter function is vested in the Joint
Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) operated by the U.S.
Department of Energy at Kirtland Air Base in Albuquerque. JNACC
is prepared to send its specially trained personnel to the site of a
radiological emergency and has done so on several occasions. This
13. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES AGENCY OF STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND RADIOACTIVE MATE-
RIALS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CALIFORNIA 430 (April 1979).
14. Letter from A. D. Lujan, B. Martinez, to the New Mexico Environmental Improve-
ment Board from the Albuquerque Fire Department in November, 1979.
15. CUMMINGS, WIPP, supra note 7, ch. 7, at 61.
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agency clearly performs a valuable service, but it is complementary
to, rather than competitive with, local emergency response personnel
who may be on the scene long before JNACC personnel arrive.
State and local authority is unquestionably paramount in the area
of emergency preparedness for radiological accidents. "It is certainly
appropriate and within the constitutional and legislative authorities
of the state governments to develop emergency response pro-
grams ... ."' 6 Federal agencies have acknowledged this fact. The
GAO reports that "state and local authorities are responsible for im-
plementing emergency measures because they 1) are usually the first
on the scene at a transportation accident and 2) have the authority
to take required protective measures, such as evacuation."' 7
The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA, now a part of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA) has made the same point:
"... it is recognized that, under our constitutional form of govern-
ment, those emergencies, unless they occur in Federally-controlled
areas or involve Federally-owned material or equipment, are in first
instance a matter of concern to State and local authority" [General
Service Administration and Federal Preparedness Agency, April,
1977].18
Emergency response planning for transportation accidents is inher-
ently more complex than planning for site-specific accidents. Re-
sponses may be called for at widely dispersed locations. Consequently,
many different officials must be prepared to be the first responsible
person on the scene. Accident conditions vary enormously, and post-
accident radiation monitoring is less immediate than in the case of
fixed-site facilities. It is impossible to drill citizens on emergency re-
spofise measures, unlike the case of fixed-site facilities, given the
large populations residing along the hundreds of miles of routes.
An adequate emergency response clearly may involve many of the
usual emergency personnel, such as police, medical personnel, and
fire fighters. An adequate response also involves individuals with spe-
cialized training in radiation detection and decontamination, radio-
logical injury treatment, and other related areas. Above all, adequate
emergency response requires effective communications among the
different elements of the response team. Communication is probably
16. Tucker, The Transportation of Radioactive Materials: Federal Preemption v. State
Regulation, 47 STATE GOVERNMENT 122,126 (1974).
17. FEDERAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO U.S. CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, 25, GA
1.13"EMD-79-18, Wash., D.C. (May 7, 1979) [hereinafter FEDERAL ACTIONS].
18. FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 3.
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the weakest link in many states' radiological emergency response
capabilities.
Not all states have emergency response plans for radiological trans-
portation accidents, but many are in the process of developing them.
In South Carolina, state highway patrol officers receive training on a
semi-annual basis for handling accidents involving nuclear materials.
California also provides radiological emergency training programs for
its highway patrol. In Colorado, emergency alert exercises are con-
ducted periodically for the state's one nuclear power facility. New
Mexico has a Radiological Emergency Response Plan which was most
recently updated in August, 1980. There has been no attempt, how-
ever, to augment New Mexico's emergency preparedness for the WIPP.
At a general level, we can cite experience to date regarding the
costs of emergency preparedness planning, and we can draw atten-
tion to the following points:
* Plans are needed; witness the case of the Rockingham, North
Carolina, accident.
* Testing of the plans at intervals is crucial to their successful func-
tioning in real emergencies: "to obtain a comprehensive picture
of emergency planning at the State level, we sent a questionnaire
to each State ... thirty-six said they had plans for dealing with
transportation accidents involving nuclear materials, but only
eight had fully tested their plans through full-scale drills involving
emergency personnel ... the plans should periodically test emer-
gency resources to reinforce training and to maintain the skills
needed to respond to a serious accident."' 9
* There is a strong case for development of regional or county
radiological emergency plans for those areas with potential nu-
clear waste transportation routes. The geographical size of the
larger western states and the large number of local officials who
would become involved in responses to accidents especially com-
pel the development of such plans in the west. The Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency2 0 has discussed the substance of such plans,
even for areas with populations of less than 5,000.
Tables 1 and 2 display estimates of historical levels of expenditure
on emergency preparedness planning at the state and local levels.
These figures are based on planning for fixed facilities, where smaller
numbers of emergency response personnel are involved. Therefore,
the corresponding figures for state-wide plans covering transportation
routes would no doubt be higher.
19. FEDERAL ACTIONS, supra note 17, at 25, 29.
20. DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, STANDARDS FOR LOCAL CIVIL
PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, D.14.8: L78 [1973] (December 1972).
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL STATE EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS COSTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES
(in 1978 dollars; per power plant site)
Initial Identifiable
Planning Recurring
State Costs Costs*
Alabama 17,776 16,749
Arkansas 240,127 96,430
California 104,354 59,445
Colorado 99,697 20,333
Connecticut 23,696 32,361
Delaware 40,250 31,625
Florida 56,700
Illinois 107,910 13,526
New Jersey 103,375 26,371
New York 56,236 98,959
Oregon 54,794 96,020
Tennessee 54,000 300
Washington 39,458 10,432
Wisconsin 15,796
Total 1,005,199 502,551
Average 89,600 80,374
*Identifiable recurring costs come from the summation of updating planning costs, exer-
cise costs, updating training costs, and updating resources costs.
Source: R. G. CUMMINGS, H. S. BURNESS, R. D. NORTON, op. cit. ch. 7.
c). Methodological Issues
Turning from institutional issues to methodological concerns, the
extent to which benefit-cost analysis may be used in designing pro-
grams of emergency preparedness naturally presents an important
area of inquiry. The costs of alternative programs are fairly easily es-
tablished. The question turns therefore on our ability to measure the
benefits of such programs. The benefits derived from improving
emergency preparedness plans takes the form of avoidance of dam-
ages. The fact that we are dealing with infrequent, probabilistic
events places us in the realm of expected values, and estimates of
damages avoided must account for the probabilities of various events
occurring. In principle, the estimation process requires the following
kinds of information:
* comprehensive classification of possible accidents into different
types, and estimation of the probability of each type occurring.
" estimation of the consequences of each type of accident.
October 19811
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS COSTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES,
ONE-STATE PLANNING
(in 1978 dollars)
Initial Identifiable
Planning Recurring
County State Costs Costs*
Morgan Alabama 455,046 7,606
Lawrence
Limestone
Humboldt California 37,791 75,243
Sacramento California 10,289 8,338
San Diego California 41,176 38,122
Tri-Town Connecticut 71,288 10,000
Citrus Florida 9,345 8,060
Levy
St. Lucie Florida 3,750 3,750
Dade Florida 5,154
Oswego New York 487 15,450
Westchester New York 50,324 21,234
Rockland
Putnam
Total 674,650 187,803
Average 137,804 32,953
*Identifiable recurring costs come from the summation of updating planning costs, exer-
cise costs, updating training costs, and updating resources costs.
Source: R. G. CUMMINGS, H.S. BURNESS, R. D. NORTON, op. cit. ch. 7.
" valuation of injury and loss of life, to the extent that it may be a
consequence of some of the accident types.
" estimation of the amount of damages in each accident type which
would be avoided with a specified improvement in emergency re-
sponse capability.
Considerable effort has been devoted to attempts at quantification
of accident probabilities and their consequences.2 1 As the companion
article in this issue by Norton shows, however, significant disagree-
ment and uncertainty regarding these quantifications remains. Norton
concludes that at present we do not have sufficiently reliable and
comprehensive evidence estimates to permit acceptable derivations of
"expected costs" associated with radiological accidents.' 2 Some spe-
21. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 1.
22. NORTON, supra note 6.
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cialists have argued that there are methodological reasons why reli-
able estimates may be unattainable.2 I For low-probability, high-
consequence occurrences, such as release of radioactivity from a
spent-fuel cask, we do not have a sample of historical frequency data
(fortunately!), and hence estimates of accident probabilities must be
derived from "fault-tree" engineering analyses. Apostolakis and
others2 4 have pointed out that fault-tree analyses require the scien-
tist to anticipate all potential mishaps, few of which have ever been
experienced before.2 s These and other authorities recommend that
little veracity be attached to the absolute probability numbers devel-
oped through "fault-tree" studies, although such numbers may be
useful for comparing the relative safety of different designs for a sys-
tem.
Clearly this kind of fundamental knowledge problem poses impor-
tant difficulties in attempting to compute the expected damages from
nuclear transportation accidents, and hence the expected benefits
from better emergency preparedness. Even if it were possible to over-
come this particular problem, another one lies in our path: the diffi-
culty of estimating the reduction in damages associated with a given
level of emergency preparedness. Attempting this class of estimates
would mean compounding the speculative nature of the numbers.
Sinclair et al.2 6 have argued that expenditures for preventive safety
should be evaluated by comparing costs with expected benefits. The
same framework would seem to apply by extension to emergency
preparedness programs, but we would argue that empirical difficulties
make Sinclair's approach infeasible in this field.
These brief comments should suffice to demonstrate that benefit-
cost analysis-or its probabilistic extension-is not applicable to the
area of emergency preparedness programs. What alternative method-
ologies remain?
Environmental economics in recent years has helped familiarize
the standards approach, in which non-economic criteria are used to
establish the desired magnitude of a program, and then economic an-
alyses are used to help devise the most efficient means of achieving
that magnitude. Examples include air quality standards and the toler-
23. Apostalakis, Probability and Risk Assessment: The Subjectivistic Viewpoint and
Some Suggestions, 19 Nuclear Safety 305 (1978).
24. MASS. DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MASS. COMM. ON NUCLEAR SAFETY,
REPORT (Sept. 1975).
25. For a further review of fault-tree procedures, see CUMMINGS, WIPP, supra note 7.
26. C. SINCLAIR, P. MARSTRAND, P. NEWICK, INNOVATION AND HUMAN RISK,
THE EVALUATION OF HUMAN LIFE AND SAFETY IN RELATION TO TECHNICAL
CHANGE (1972).
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able level of pollution in lakes. Such standards are easier to establish
when there are clearly defined thresholds or discrete alternatives. In
the case of lakes, aquatic research has established thresholds for var-
ious pollutant concentrations beyond which certain species of fish
cannot survive. The lack of an obvious threshold poses one of the
most basic problems in developing and maintaining a consensus on
what air quality standards should be.
For emergency preparedness programs, clear-cut choices exist. A
fireman either has been trained to deal with combustion of radioac-
tive materials or he hasn't; a policeman has radiation detection equip-
ment in his car or he doesn't. Of course, there are degrees of ade-
quacy in training, for example, but basically the choices are discrete
in nature. The WIPP study reached the conclusion that an adequate
level of protection for New Mexico could be guaranteed only by im-
plementing certain training and equipment purchase programs, given
that several dozen transportation accidents involving radioactive
materials could be expected over the lifetime of the WIPP.2 ' Other
states might be well advised to adopt a standards approach to review
the status of their preparedness for radiological transportation acci-
dents.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We would like to wrap up the foregoing discussion by listing the
major points which have emerged:
* At the state and local level, emergency preparedness for nuclear
transportation accidents needs more attention and resources.
* Pre-notification regarding the contents of shipments is necessary
to enable state and local officials to carry out their responsibili-
ties, but pre-notification in the form contemplated in most dis-
cussions of the issue may not be necessary.
* The potential decision regarding evacuation from the area sur-
rounding an accident could be the most important post-accident
decision from a public safety viewpoint, and yet the prevailing
division of responsibilities in most states is not conducive to
making this decision in a timely and informed manner.
* Emergency response facilities probably do not have to be spaced
closer together along transportation routes for the sake of han-
dling radiological accidents, but further investment in training
and equipment for local officials is needed.
" From a public safety viewpoint, it is not wise to rely on federal
regional response teams as substitutes for local capabilities.
27. CUMMINGS, WIPP, supra note 7.
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* The costs of training, equipment purchase, and development and
testing of emergency response plans can run into millions of dol-
lars per state.
* Economic benefit-cost analysis is not a useful guide to decisions
on emergency preparedness expenditures, but the standards ap-
proach offers a promising framework.
